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Ann H. Spiotto*
INTRODUCTION
When a consumer thinks about using a financial account
aggregation site, one concern is whether or not such use is safe. A
related question is who has responsibility for unauthorized
transactions or other fraud-related problems occurring as a result
of a consumer providing his account information, usernames, and
personal identification numbers ("PINS") or other access codes to
the aggregation site. An additional question is, who is responsible
for costs and expenses incurred by the consumer as a result of
actions he takes based upon inaccurate, incomplete or obsolete
information (bad account data) provided at the site.
This Article explores the potential financial risks to the
consumer and account holding financial institutions ("AHBanks")
from aggregation. It also analyzes the current state of the law and
*Ms. Spiotto is senior research counsel with the Emerging Payments Studies
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. She received a J.D. from
the University of Chicago in 1972 and is a member of the Illinois Bar. The author
would like to thank Patricia Allouise, Sujit Chakravorti, Sarah Jane Hughes,
Leslie Mitchell, Sukhinder Singh, and David A. Stein for helpful comments on
previous drafts. Special thanks to Brian Mantel for his support in reviewing and
critiquing this Article. This Article reflects the author's preliminary views in
connection with a developing business and technology product. Business,
technology and laws are subject to changes in substance and interpretation. As
the business and technology evolves, the legal analysis may also change and
evolve. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author alone and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. It does not provide legal
advice to be relied upon by consumers, account holding financial institutions, or
aggregators, each of whom should consult with their own attorney or legal
advisor for advice on questions about liability issues in connection with
aggregation.
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contractual relationships relevant to such risks. It concludes that:
(1) with respect to unauthorized transactions, parties other than
the consumer appear to bear the ultimate liability for financial
losses in most situations and parties other than the AHBank
appear to bear the ultimate responsibility for financial losses in a
number of situations, and (2) with respect to losses resulting from
reliance upon bad account data, the consumer will probably have a
more difficult time shifting losses to either the AHBank or another
party.
The question of whether legislative or regulatory action is
necessary at this time with respect to liability issues is then
addressed, with the conclusion reached that at the current stage in
the evolution of aggregation services such action appears to be
premature.
The following framework is used in reaching these
conclusions. First, the question "What is financial account
aggregation?" is addressed in Part I. Part II identifies and
discusses potential financial liabilities connected to aggregation,
specifically those resulting from the display of inaccurate,
incorrect, or incomplete information and those resulting from
unauthorized transactions. Part III follows with an analysis of who
has liability for unauthorized transactions, beginning with a
discussion of the basic rules ("SIMPLE ANSWERS") governing
liability in those simple situations where an unauthorized
transaction occurs and the consumer has not used an aggregation
site.
After conclusions are reached for the simple situations, Part
IV continues the analysis by adding one additional factor to those
situations already discussed: the consumer signs up for aggregation.
It analyzes whether and how the previously defined SIMPLE
ANSWERS change once the existence of the consumer's relationship
with an aggregation site is added to the mix. After this discussion,
the author concludes that significant concerns over consumer or
AHBank liability for unauthorized transactions as a consequence
of the consumer arranging for aggregation are premature at this
time. Consequently, Part V offers some suggestions on why such
concerns exist and why the evolution of aggregation over the past
couple of years should have diminished those concerns.
This Article concludes that at this stage in the evolution of
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aggregation services, legislative/regulatory action with respect to
liability issues is premature and recommends that no such action be
taken at this time. It points out that where theoretical problems
are "solved" by new legislation/regulations before problems
actually develop, the solutions may be unnecessary or result in
unanticipated negative consequences. It recommends that (1) the
financial services industry be allowed to exercise its judgment in
developing the aggregation product under the existing regulatory
framework and (2) regulators continue to monitor business
practices and developments in connection with the aggregation
product and take regulatory action only if the need is actually
demonstrated.
I. WHAT IS FINANCIAL ACCOUNT AGGREGATION?
In order to answer the questions identified above, one must
understand what aggregation is and who the participants are.
Aggregation as discussed in this Article is relatively new, appearing
on the landscape in 1999-2000. A Morgan Stanley Report
estimates that there were just 10,000 aggregation users nationwide
at the beginning of 2000; by September 2000, the number was
estimated to be 500,000;1 and at the beginning of 2002, the number
of aggregation service users was estimated by various analysts at
between 300,000 and one million U.S. consumers.
2
1. See Henry H. McVey & Prem G. Kumar, The Next Big Thing: Account
Aggregation, in 2000 MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WRITER INDUSTRY REP., at 4
(2000) (on file with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) [hereinafter MORGAN
STANLEY REPORT].
2. See Andrew Roth, Aggregation's Advance Impeded By Data Issues, AM.
BANKER, July 26, 2001, at 1 (quoting BANKING INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY
SECRETARIAT ("BITS"), BITS VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR AGGREGATION
SERVICES (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.bitsinfo.org (last visited Apr. 2,
2003) [hereinafter BITS VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES]); see also Ray Graber,
Comment, Aggregation Providers Don't Yet Have It Together, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 14, 2001, at 10 ("The public's interest in aggregation far outweighs the
propensity to sign up for it. Consumers like the concept, but balk at enrolling for
it because of setup headaches .... "); Jack M. Pullara, Aggregation's Risks, Costs
Not Justified, AM. BANKER, Nov. 16, 2001, at 8 (indicating that conservative
estimates put the number close to 600,000 active users, i.e., customers who access
the aggregation site at least once every thirty days). As of January 1, 2002,
aggregation sites powered by Yodlee had over 2.2 million registered users; of
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The following simple statement conveys the essence of
aggregation:
Web aggregation services are provided by companies -either
financial institutions or third-party Internet companies-that
[the consumer] can authorize to collect [his] account
information so [he] can view it at a single place on the Internet.
[The consumer gives] the Web aggregator [his] account
information (which may include checking, savings, insurance,
mortgage, credit card, investment and brokerage accounts),
[his] ID codes and passwords. In turn, the Web aggregator
collects [his] account information online and allows [him] to
access it, with a password, on its Web site for "one stop"
viewing.'
In other words, aggregation is the consolidation of on-line
financial account information (e.g., from banks, billers and
brokerages) for on-line retrieval at one site. In a typical
outsourcing arrangement, an intermediary (e.g., a bank, brokerage
firm or portal) agrees with a third party service provider to provide
the service to consumers-the intermediary would then generally
privately label the service and offer consumers access to it at the
intermediary's website.' Alternatively, the two companies could
these, roughly 1.1 million had been active within the preceding ninety days. See
Interview with Sukhinder Singh, Vice President of Yodlee (Jan. 18, 2002)
[hereinafter Yodlee Interview]. By the end of third quarter 2002, published
reports indicate that Yodlee had three million users (but that less than 50% of
these are active). See, e.g., Priya Malhotra, Technology Market's Woes Aside,
Yodlee Lands $2.4M, AM. BANKER, Sept. 17, 2002, at 1; Lucas Mearian, Online
Aggregation Failing to Deliver ROI for Banks, COMPUTERWORLD, July 8, 2002, at
7.
3. MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
4. See Yodlee Interview, supra note 2; see also, e.g., Thomas P. Vartanian,
Regulators Eye Electronic Banking Boundaries, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21, 2001, at
20A; Megan J. Ptacek, Aggregation Pits Banks Against Web Portals, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 8, 2000, at 1; Nicole Duran, BITS Publishes Aggregation
Guidelines, AM. BANKER, Apr. 20, 2001, at 2; Larry Altman et al., Run for the
Money: The Battle for Online Aggregation Business, Booz ALLEN HAMILTON,
INC. ENEWS, Jan. 15, 2001, available at
http://strategy-business.com/press/enewsarticle?art=15222&pg=0; Thomas P.
Vartanian & Robert H. Ledig, Scrape It Scrub It and Show It: The Battle over
Data Aggregation (2000), available at
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co-brand the service and offer access to it through the
intermediary's website5 or the bank could provide an on-premises
aggregation service solely in its own name based on
technology/software that it either developed itself or licensed from
a third party provider.6 However, as the BITS Aggregation
Services Working Group pointed out, "any company with any level
of security can begin to offer aggregation services, potentially
putting customers, financial institutions and even the aggregation
model itself at risk."
7
While several different models for aggregation services exist,
the most prevalent method today is still "screen scraping," which
involves the simulation of user behavior to access the financial
account website and to scrape account summary information from
the site.' With screen scraping, it is necessary for the consumer to
disclose primary authentication credentials (i.e., the username and
PINS) for the financial account's site to the aggregator in order for
the aggregator to access the financial account.9 This information is
stored on the aggregator's servers to avoid having users re-enter it
http://www.ffhsj.combancmail/bmarts/abaart.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
BITS has recently pointed out that "the vast majority of aggregation services
offered by [financial institutions] are outsourced to third-party vendors." BITS,
BITS AGGREGATION SERVICES REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, May 2002, at 6,
available at http://www.bitsinfo.org [hereinafter BITS RFI]; MORGAN STANLEY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 14; BITS VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 2
(defining the roles that various entities play in account aggregation.
5. See Yodlee Interview, supra note 2.
6. See Priya Malhotra, UMonitor Mining Small-Bank Aggregation Market,
AM. BANKER, June 21, 2002, at 10.
7. BITS, PROPOSED BITS MINIMUM BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS,
GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AGGREGATION SERVICE PROVIDERS
PHASE I (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://www.bitsinfo.org [hereinafter BITS
PROPOSED GUIDELINES].
8. See, e.g., Raymond Graber, Aggregation and the Limits of Screen
Scraping, AM. BANKER, Nov. 13, 2001, at 10A (indicating that "[a]ccording to
TowerGroup estimates, 70% of account aggregation information is gathered
through screen scraping."); Roth, supra note 2; Malhotra, supra note 6 (indicating
that Yodlee now uses screen-scraping to collect 65% of the account data it
presents, down from 100% initially, and that by contrast 90% of Teknowledge's
data currently comes from screen-scraping).
9. See BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 3.
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on each subsequent visit.1" The aggregator issues the consumer a
username and password for the aggregation site itself." Where
screen scraping is used, the aggregator may have no contractual
relationship with the AHBank and that financial institution may
assume no. responsibility to make sure that the aggregator
accurately reflects the scraped information. 2  Individual
aggregators retain different amounts (e.g., one month of historical
data as compared to three months) and types (e.g., summary credit
card account balances as compared to individual transaction
details) of account data for different periods of time.13 Potential
alternatives to screen scraping include transfer of data over the
Internet based on agreement between the aggregator and the
financial account provider." Work is ongoing at this time in
various industry groups to promote the data feed of financial
account data to aggregators in a reliable manner."
10. See id.; MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
11. See MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 14; BITS VOLUNTARY
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at D17-18.
12. See BITS PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at J-1.
13. See MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
14. See BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 5 (describing "screen scraping" as the
most commonly used technology used in aggregation and indicates that the intent
of the RFI is to "elicit feedback from the aggregator provider vendor community
on potential solutions that address the problems faced with the current
mechanisms, processes and technologies used in account aggregation.").
15. See, e.g., BITS RFI, supra note 4 (indicating that BITS intends to use
responses to the RFI to "help develop industry guidelines for authentication and
data exchange models that support enhanced financial aggregation services."). In
addition, BITS:
[S]eeks to determine the best alternatives to improve financial service
authentication and data exchange practices. More specifically, the RFI seeks to
understand options for improving safety and soundness in aggregation services
that eliminate the requirement to share customer credentials with external third
parties not contractually responsible to the RFI .... Also, the RFI seeks to
explore complementary data feed options which ... will provide efficient,
auditable and non-reputable traceability of services initiated by the RFI's
customer or designated authorized agent.
BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 8; see also Duran, supra note 4 (describing BITS's
voluntary guidelines for aggregation and its ongoing work to "eliminate screen
scraping."); Carol Power, Will OFX Be the Online Data Exchange Standard?,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 2000, at 10A. The Financial Services Technology
Consortium ("FSTC") has undertaken an Aggregation Initiative to identify,
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Predictions are that aggregation services will evolve to become
part of financial institutions' overall online banking efforts, and
that financial transactions (e.g., the ability to initiate fund transfers
between aggregated accounts and third parties) will likely be
included as a basic part of aggregation service. 6 Additionally, the
use of aggregation services by financial advisors and in connection
with providing investment recommendations on-line to the "mass
affluent" are being explored as potentially viable niche markets. 7
Why would a consumer authorize aggregation? The primary
reason suggested in the Morgan Stanley Report is:
[S]imply because it will make managing their financial lives
much easier. In our opinion remembering only one password
for all your accounts, logging into those accounts with one click,
and viewing consolidated financial data on one page really does
make life easier. In the near future, however, we expect
aggregation to become even more useful to consumers when
new technologies like funds transfer, bill payment, online
advice, and wireless aggregation are widely deployed.'"
However, a number of commentators have questioned the
value of aggregation services to consumers and suggested that what
is available on aggregation sites is of limited interest to most
consumers.' 9  Contrary to the Morgan Stanley Report's
develop and pilot needed common protocols, connectivity and capabilities to
eliminate the sharing of credentials and to eliminate the need to screen scrape
financial data. See FSTC, Aggregation Initiative Design Phase Proposal, available
at http://www.fstc.org/projects/fastaggregation.cfn.
16. See BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that "[a]dditional functionality,
incorporating funds transfer transactions and other higher risk processes, is
emerging in the second phase of product development."); Steve Bills, Online
Banking: B of A Makes Its Case-We're the Online Bank of America, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 11, 2002, at 1.
17. See, e.g., Chris Costanzo, Working Out the Kinks in Serving the Mass
Affluent, AM. BANKER, Aug. 20, 2002, at 4A; Dave Yonamine, Is There
Justification for Aggregation? The Value of Account Aggregation for the Affluent,
in ABA TRUSTS & INVESTMENTS, 33 (2002); Priya Malhotra, CashEdge: Advisers
the Best Aggregation Clients, AM. BANKER, July 26, 2002, at 11.
18. MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
19. See, e.g., Yonamine, supra note 17; Lynn Cowan, All in One-Account
Aggregation Software May Work Better in Theory Than in Practice, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 29, 2001, at R17.
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conclusions, a senior analyst with technology consulting firm
Tower Group recently suggested that the adoption rates are low
because of consumer's privacy, security and accountability
concerns, indicating that "most consumers are waiting for
additional value manifested in new services such as funds transfer
and advice, before taking the plunge."2 Similarly, the value of
aggregation services to financial advisors has been the subject of
some disagreement.2'
Why would a financial institution offer aggregation services to
its customers? The Morgan Stanley Report identified several
benefits including customer retention, brand enhancement, and
new sources of revenue. However, the value of aggregation to
20. Graber, supra note 2; see also Roth, supra note 2 ("People in the high-
net-worth-bracket are the most active users of aggregation and stand to benefit
most from the next phase of its development."). The next phase apparently
includes financial planning, portfolio analysis and investment planning plus the
ability to transfer funds between accounts and to pay bills. It appears that this
next phase will require a shifting away from screen scraping and toward direct
data feeds from AHBanks. According to Jack Pullara, a senior manager at
PricewaterhouseCoopers:
What is keeping more customers from signing up? Apart from the security and
privacy pitfalls that many customers express as serious concerns, there is the
issue of functionality. What is the real benefit of being able to see account data
from five or so different companies that I do business with, presented on the
same Web site, if it means exposing myself to identity theft or other potential
misuse of my very private financial data? ... Aggregators and financial
institutions must remember that the currently limited functionality does not
justify the risks that consumers must assume.
Pullara, supra note 2.
21. See, e.g., Costanzo, supra note 17; Banks Pin Their Back-Office Hopes on
Successors to Screen Scrapers, U.S. BANKER, Aug. 2002, at 24 (noting that "[f]or
all the hoopla about account aggregation and its benefits to financial advisers,
there has not been much to show for it," suggesting that since: (a) the scraped
data "is a snapshot and does not include a customer's investment history"; and
(b) screen scraping can provide "an inaccurate picture of a customer's financial
situation" given that "[w]eb sites update data at different times," it is difficult for
financial advisors/representatives to provide timely and accurate advice based
upon it). Cf Malhotra, supra note 17.
22. MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 25. But see Jessica Toonkel,
As Aggregation Gains, Doubt on Cross-Selling, AM. BANKER, Sept. 19, 2000, at 1
(reporting that early-on cross-selling was seen as a potential revenue source from
aggregation but that customer surveys indicate that this may be
counterproductive).
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financial institutions has also been questioned. A summer 2001
report by Forrester Research is frequently quoted for questioning
the value of aggregation and concluding that most firms should not
bother with it today as "[t]here's no [return on investment] ROI on
aggregation.'"" The report observed that "[a] good number of
banks say that the No. 1 reason they offer account aggregation is to
increase customer retention, 'but that's bogus.' Bankers are
abusing the retention benefit and are using it for every technology.
That makes it almost impossible to measure a product's value."2
During periods of economic downturn, financial institutions
carefully scrutinize all of their expenses and investments in
technology; aggregation has gotten some negative attention in this
context. Thus, at this time, aggregation may be at a crossroads. It
had a fairly dramatic and well-publicized early adoption by
23. Lauren Weber, Aggregation Gaining Converts, If Not Fees, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 21, 2001, at 11A (quoting Catherine Graber, Account Aggregation: The
Elusive ROI, in 2001 FORRESTER RESEARCH REP)) (emphasis added); Lauren
Weber, In Brief: Aggregation Merger: Adhesion and Ettache, AM. BANKER, Aug.
17, 2001, at 13; Mark Bruno, Questions About Aggregation, U.S. BANKER, Oct.
2001, at 48; see also Megan J. Ptacek, Aggregation Revenue-Drain Pegged at $28B
for Banks, AM. BANKER, Apr. 17, 2001, at 12 (citing consulting firm Novantas for
the projection that banks offering aggregation stand to lose up to $28 billion of
revenue to customers moving their money to accounts that earn more interest);
Julie Monahan, Banks Still Focusing on Yodlee's Potential, AM. BANKER, Nov.
13, 2001, at 6A.
Recent statistics seem to make one wonder why organizations are making the
not-so-small investment in account aggregation. Companies who have signed up
with aggregation service providers have discovered that the services certainly
do not qualify as a cheap date; it costs roughly half a million dollars to
implement Yodlee's account aggregation software on a company's Web site,
and then there is the $8-$12 that Yodlee collects per user per year.
Pullara, supra note 2. But see Yodlee, supra note 2 (disagreeing with Ms.
Graber's conclusion).
24. Bruno, supra note 23.
25. See Andrew Roth, Slow Growth Expected in Bank Tech Spending, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 13, 2001 at 4A.
Banks are rethinking their investments in technology now that the days of the
'blank check' are gone. As banks examine their IT budgets, peripheral
technologies, those that lack a specific return on investment are being carefully
scrutinized. The function that has been drawing perhaps the greatest attention
is account aggregation, leaving many bankers and techies to ask whether the
investment is worth it.
Bruno, supra note 23.
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financial institutions in 2000 but its value from the customer
retention and ROI standpoint still appears to be in question as of
mid 2002.26
II. WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL FINANCIAL LIABILITIES
RESULTING FROM AGGREGATION?
According to the Morgan Stanley Report, aggregation involves
a distinct set of risks for the companies that offer the service and
for the consumers that use it.27 The AHBanks' primary financial
liability concerns with screen scraping-based aggregation involve
the exposure of usernames and PINS to aggregators.' However, as
26. See, e.g., Geoffrey Smith, Account Aggregation Falls Apart; This
Ballyhooed Online Service Has a Fatal Flaw: You Can See All Your Financial
Data at One Site, But You Can't Manipulate It, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, July 3, 2002;
Jeremy Quittner, Online Bill Payment Gains Popularity While Customers Eschew
Aggregation, AM. BANKER, July 23, 2002, at 6A; Marija Potkonjak, Trendspotters
See Advice Redefining Aggregation, AM. BANKER, Aug. 20, 2002, at 8A; Amanda
Fung, Wary Bankers Tiptoe into Account Aggregation, AM. BANKER, Apr. 10,
2002, at 12A; Nuala Moran, Banks and Customers Take Time To Get It All
Together: Account Aggregation, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 4, 2002, at 6.
27. MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
28. See, e.g., OCC, BULLETIN ON BANK-PROVIDED ACCOUNT
AGGREGATION SERVICES 2-6 (Feb. 28, 2001) (discussing potential risks from
aggregation), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/occcurrent.htm [hereinafter
OCC]; BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 6; MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at
28-30. The Morgan Stanley Report concisely summarizes the basic risks of
aggregation. With respect to the legal liability risk it notes:
Liability. One largely unsettled issue concerning aggregation is the future of
government regulation and legal liability. There are two principal pieces of
legislation through which account aggregation will be regulated in the
future ....
The first is the Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) Act of 1978 ... Since many
legal experts think that online banking and brokerage Web sites fall under the
domain of electronic devices, liability for transactions processed through those
Web sites still rests with the financial institution. Therefore, even if a
transaction is initiated on an aggregated page (based on inaccurate data,
potentially), liability for that transaction still appears to rest with the concerned
financial institution.
The banking industry is obviously not pleased with that interpretation of the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act. As a result, the Federal Reserve is currently
deciding whether Regulation E will also apply to aggregators, to ensure that
liability for transactions rests with the party at which the transaction is initiated.
MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-30.
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the possibility of aggregation services supporting funds transfers
from one AHBank to another becomes a reality, concerns about
data accuracy and credentials management (i.e., authentication of
the identity of parties accessing data) are taking on added
significance.29 In the early days of aggregation, concerns also
focused upon the basic inability of financial institutions to identify
aggregators accessing a consumer's account.' In today's
environment, AHBanks appear to be generally able to track
whether or not a particular access to or transaction against a
financial account was initiated by the consumer or was made by an
aggregation site (and, if by an aggregator, the identity of the
aggregator)."
Two primary ways in which use of aggregation sites by
consumers might result in financial loss have been suggested in
critiques of the service.32 Generally, these are financial loss related
to reliance upon bad account data and unauthorized transactions
29. See BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 5, 6-8.
30. See BITS PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at G-1.
31. See Yodlee, supra note 2 (indicating that an AHBank can review its
server log to track the URL from which an inquiry or transaction is initiated and
can identify an aggregation site from the URL).
32. Risks to consumers include:
Security. Since aggregation requires that consumers sign over access to their
accounts, it raises the risk that someone could gain unauthorized access to those
accounts. If a hacker (or, potentially, even a criminally minded employee) were
to crack into an aggregation data network, he would acquire a panoply of
personal account information as well as the passwords to access those accounts.
He could then use those passwords to transfer money out of certain accounts,
or at least to wreak havoc by conducting unauthorized transactions. Although
we are not aware of any such security breaches, the possibility does exist.
Data accuracy. Given that many consumers will rely on the data on their
aggregated pages to make financial decisions, aggregation also creates the risk
that inaccurate or delayed data could lead users to make ill-informed financial
decisions. For example, a consumer could check stock prices on his aggregated
page and then decide to execute a transaction based on the data displayed
there. If the data collected from his brokerage account had not been updated
for a few hours, he could conceivably execute the transaction at a price
different from the price displayed on his aggregated page. In the worst case,
the customer might rely on inaccurate data on his aggregated page (since screen
scraping is not 100% accurate) to make financial decisions.
MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 2&
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or actions leading to loss.33 While these issues of liability and
financial loss come up frequently in articles and discussions,
generally the discussions appear to be theoretical rather than based
on practical problems that are actually being raised with AHBanks
by customers.34
A. Display of Inaccurate, Incorrect or Incomplete Data
The first potential problem involves the display of bad account
data at the aggregation site.35 If a consumer thinks that he is
viewing real-time information about his checking account and
writes a check based on that information, the consumer could
suffer embarrassment or financial loss if, in fact, the information is
two days old and there are insufficient funds remaining in the
account to cover the check.36
Screen scraping does not guarantee 100% accuracy in the data
collected-changes in Web site layouts and the addition or removal
of links to account information can result in the retrieval of
33. See id; see also BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 5, 6-8.
34. See, e.g., Graber, supra note 2; Roth, supra note 2. The author has not
found any American Banker articles reporting on situations where an AHBank
or its customer has actually attempted to obtain reimbursement for a financial
loss claimed to be attributable to the customer's participation in an aggregation
site. Discussions with a smattering of knowledgeable bank lawyers, vendor
representatives, and regulatory personnel at the end of 2001/beginning of 2002
did not uncover reported instances of such customer or AHBank loss.
35. With screen scraping, concerns have been expressed about the low
quality of scraped data and completeness, and its use in transactions. For
example:
Account aggregation is useful because of customization-users' ability to tailor
the service to their preferences .... This, however, is predicated on the
assumption that the provider can deliver clean, accurate, and timely data. One
financial institution offering aggregation is experiencing a 20% error rate in its
overnight batch collection, mainly because of slip-ups that occur in data
transportation, lack of familiarity with the aggregation provider, and customers
changing their passwords without informing the aggregation provider.
Graber, supra note 2.
36. As summarized by the OCC, "If the integrity of the data is compromised
or if the data is not current, the customer could receive erroneous or dated
information, which could adversely affect customer decision making." OCC,
supra note 28, at 3.
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inaccurate information.37 Inaccurate data can also result if the
aggregator bypasses safeguards and data checks that the AHBank
would otherwise have in place to detect or prevent errors.38
Problems can be inherent in aggregation if the consumer does not
understand the time lags and other constraints surrounding the
display of data by the aggregator or the underlying AHBank site.39
37. For example:
Current aggregation services rely on screen scraping as a primary data
collection mechanism. As such, they are constantly struggling with changes in
source data, website designs, data placements and formats. Additionally, since
one of the major premises of account aggregation is to provide the end
consumer with a consistent and integrated view, the ability to do so with data
from a myriad of sources poses its own challenges. For example, one website
might provide negative financial balances with a number preceded by a dash "-"
while another might indicate the same through color or by position in a
particular column.
BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 6.
38. See, e.g., Graber, supra note 8 (detailing a discussion of the practical data
accuracy/ timeliness problems with using screen scraping as a basis for
aggregation). In late 2001, Mr. Graber estimated that "success rates for
overnight batch-processing data-gathering are about 75%," and indicated that:
"[S]creen scraping cannot guarantee the accuracy and timeliness of data that
consumers expect from financial institutions. Inaccurate data will eventually
undermine consumer confidence-and consumers will stop using aggregation
services dependent on this technology." Id.
39. Generally screen scrapers utilize a time stamp mechanism which shows
the time and date that data is updated by the screen scraper. See Yodlee, supra
note 2. The primary questions that arise involve old data at the scraped site and
whether the scraper is able to access a site to refresh information (e.g., if the
aggregator attempts to access a site when that site is being updated, the
aggregator is unable to obtain access). Yodlee advises that, in reality, customers
don't seem to have problems with confusion over old data-customers may be
concerned that data is old, but, generally, they understand that it is old. See id.
As important as the accurate and consistent interpretation of the data collected
is the timeliness of its collection. Again, in the screen scraping model, financial
institution websites might update daily account balances at various times during
the day. Synchronizing such information without cooperation of the source
data institution can be difficult and inconsistent.
BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 6
The lengthy, comprehensive disclaimer language used in the Terms and
Conditions governing access to aggregation Web sites of such major financial
institutions as Citibank and JP Morgan Chase are indicative that these
institutions have a clear understanding of the limitations on the data provided at
such sites. See, e.g., Chase Online Plus Web, at http://www.chase.com (last visited
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It should be pointed out that these same problems may well exist at
a financial institution's on-line banking website today and that the
data provided at such sites is not necessarily real time. Financial
institutions differ on their own on-line banking websites as to the
timeliness of data updates and disclosure of the limitations of
displayed data.' With respect to who is responsible for financial
losses caused by reliance on bad account data, no court decisions
providing direct guidance on this issue appear to have been
reported. This is not particularly surprising given the relative
youth of aggregation services. Nor has the author found evidence
in the trade press or in discussions with industry participants
suggesting that consumers perceive themselves to be suffering any
significant real dollar losses due to participation in aggregation.
1. Aggregator Liability
Whether or not an aggregator would have legal liability to the
consumer for losses suffered as a result of reliance on bad account
data displayed at the aggregation site is an open question.1 The
Apr. 2, 2003); Myciti Web, at http://www.myciti.com/terms.html (last visited Apr.
2, 2003). The Chase Online Plus Terms and Conditions runs more than three
pages-it contains numerous different lengthy disclaimers of liability, including:
"Because of the possibility of human and mechanical error as well as other
factors, the website (including all information and materials contained on the
website) is provided 'as is' 'as available.' JPMorgan Chase and third party data
providers are not providing any warranties and representations regarding the
website." Chase Online Plus Web, at http://www.chase.com (last visited Apr. 2,
2003).
40. See, e.g., BITS RFI, supra note 4, at 6; see also First USA Bank, N.A.,
which makes the following disclaimer with respect to data displayed on its Web
site:
We will use our best efforts to include accurate and up to date information on
the Site, but we make no warranties or representations as to the accuracy of the
information. You agree that all access and use of the Site and its contents is at
your own risk. By using the Site, you acknowledge that we specifically disclaim
any liability (whether based in contract, tort, strict liability or otherwise) for any
direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, or special damages arising out of or in
any way connected with your access to or use of the Site ....
First USA Web site, Terms of Use, at
http://cardmemberservices.firstusa.com/globals/terms.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2003).
41. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 2, in which Mr. Roth stated:
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consumer's argument in favor of aggregator liability might be that:
(1) the aggregator was offering a service (particularly a fee-based
service) based upon account data that it knew was so suspect and
unreliable that its offering constituted negligence and (2) the
presence of mice-type liability disclaimers and/or the wording used
in such disclaimers was not adequate to inform the consumer of
data limitations or that reliance upon information provided by the
aggregation service might result in financial losses. 2
The aggregator could probably limit, and even eliminate, any
potential legal liability by appropriately advising the consumer in
the aggregation site's "Terms and Conditions of Use" of known
limitations on the accuracy, completeness or correctness of data
using understandable language in a clear and readable format.
However, whether inclusion of a disclaimer or whether the specific
disclaimer language would be adequate to eliminate aggregator
liability to the consumer in a given situation would generally be a
question of fact.43
2. AHBank Liability
Despite the lack of reported precedent, logic suggests that a
consumer should not be able to impose legal liability upon an
If the players fail to address the accuracy issue, it could be costly for all those
involved: financial institutions, vendors and customers. What these parties
don't sort out among themselves could be sorted out in the courts, because it is
unclear where blame will fall if erroneous information results in financial loss.
"There is not a lot of law out there right now, no guidepost in terms of the court
stepping in." said John Burke, counsel to BITS and an attorney at Foley Hoag
LLP in Washington. "How you get information-what its currency is in terms
of accuracy and who will be liable if consumers make a bad judgment based on
data that is provided through an aggregation service-will only be resolved if
there is litigation." he said. So far he has not heard of any such lawsuits.
"Screen scraping is a pretty clunky technology." Mr. Burke said. "Using
consumers' access codes, you don't know when the Web site was modified or
updated, or, frankly, what the accuracy of the data is."
Id.
42. See generally Roth, supra note 25, at 6A.
43. The author has been advised by Yodlee that aggregation sites generally
attempt to limit their liability in the Terms and Conditions displayed at the site.
See, e.g., Chase Online Plus, supra note 39; Myciti Terms and Conditions, at
http://www.myciti.com/terms.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
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AHBank in situations where the consumer's financial loss resulted
from reliance on bad account data displayed at a third party
aggregation site where the incorrect information has been screen
scraped from the AHBank without its consent." General
principles of fairness and equity should not support imposition of
such liability. The conclusion should not change where the
AHBank is providing data to the aggregation site via a data feed
arrangement at the specific request of the consumer; assuming, of
course, that the data provided by the AHBank was accurate and
was provided to the aggregator in accordance with agreed upon
specifications.
An AHBank could improve its already strong position by
clearly stating in its account documentation that it has no
responsibility and disclaims all liability for manipulation or display
of account data by unrelated third parties, specifically including
data provided to an aggregator at the consumer's request. Legal
counsel could reasonably advise the AHBank to refuse to
voluntarily assume responsibility for bad account data displayed at
an unrelated aggregation site. These conclusions assume,
naturally, that the information at the base AHBank website was
accurate, appropriately displayed, and labeled at that site with
whatever data limitations exist (e.g., that the data displayed is as of
midnight on the previous business day).
Of course, in special situations, the AHBank officer
responsible for the customer relationship could make a voluntary
concession and reimburse the customer for the loss. A concession
44. See Graber, supra note 2.
45. The conclusions expressed in this paragraph represent the author's views,
based upon nearly thirty years of experience practicing law in the consumer
financial services area, of what the results should be if litigation does arise.
However, in the absence of controlling precedents, differing conclusions are
certainly possible. "[Cilarity, simplicity and uniformity have been in short supply
in the consumer financial services arena in recent years." Lynn B. Barr et al.,
Introduction to the 2001 Annual Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law, 56
Bus. LAW. 1084, 1087 (2001). The authors' further point out that: "Clearly, this
is a time of major and rapid changes in consumer financial services law, with
long-standing and fundamental principles being constantly questioned and either
defended or swept away, and new legal issues being asserted, confronted and
resolved for the first time." Id.
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might be made based upon account profitability, length of
relationship or other factors (such as the negative impression given
of the AHBank if it refuses to handle a complaint made by an 89
year old customer to her satisfaction). Additionally, the AHBank
could contractually agree with its customer to assume liability for
losses suffered due to bad data appearing on its home banking site.
B. Unauthorized Transactions or Unauthorized Actions
The second problem area involves unauthorized transactions
or actions occurring as a result of information being provided to
the aggregation site. While a number of potential scenarios could
result in unauthorized transactions, they fall into two basic
categories.
1. External Event or Act
The first type of scenario involves a hacker accessing the site,
obtaining information and subsequently using it to perpetrate an
unauthorized transaction or to undertake other fraudulent activity.
The BITS Working Group, in attempting to define minimum
security requirements for "trusted" aggregation services, has
articulated that the general framework for implementation should
be designed to protect the most sensitive information from direct
Internet access (i.e., to reduce impacts from a single compromise of
a server).46 The Morgan Stanley Report made the following
observation about the dangers of aggregation: simply put, an
aggregation site is a hacker's dream. The wealth of passwords,
personal data, and access to financial accounts that aggregation
sites contain could make breaking into one aggregation site more
worthwhile than breaking into hundreds of individual sites.47
2. Internal Event or Act
The second type of scenario involves the use of information
obtained from a site to make an unauthorized transaction by those
46. See BITS PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at F-1.
47. See MORGAN STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
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providing the site, or their agents or employees. The BITS
Working Group has noted that "although focus is often placed on
the Internet and the hacker, reality is that 75% to 85% of all
compromises occur from within a corporation.""8 By mid-2002, no
reported court decisions have been identified providing direct
guidance on the issue of who is responsible for financial losses
caused by participation in an aggregation service. Nor has the
author identified anything suggesting that significant problems are
being reported by consumers. However, in discussing liability
issues, clearly the conclusions depend on many factors and will
differ depending upon specific fact situations. The answer to the
question of who has liability depends on the particular problem
encountered by the consumer and is discussed in detail in Parts III
and IV below.
III. SIMPLE ANSWERS-As TO WHO HAS LIABILITY FOR
UNAUTHORIZED TRANSACTIONS
If an unauthorized transaction is made from a consumer's
financial account, the simple answer as to who bears the financial
loss under the law as of the middle of 2002 is that the responsibility
varies depending on the type of unauthorized transaction and/or
the account from which the unauthorized transaction is made.49
Also, lawyers may argue and disagree as to the simple answer and
what the law is based on the parsing of words and differing
conceptualizations of fact situations.
A fairly simplistic view of current laws and regulations
suggests that generally the consumer is required to be protected
and to be made whole, and initial responsibility to make the
consumer whole will be borne by an AHBank.5 However,
48. See BITS PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at F-4.
49. See Monahan, supra note 23; see also Thomas Vartanian, Regulators Eye
Electronic Banking Boundaries, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21, 2001, at 20A.
50. At a September 11-12, 2000 Conference on Account Aggregation
sponsored by Thomson Financial Media, a panel of lawyers discussing
"Aggregation-Legal and Public Policy Issues" expressed the general views that:
(1) the consumer is not at risk of loss for unauthorized transactions if the
aggregation business is to survive; and (2) if the consumer suffers a loss because
of the aggregator's negligence or misfeasance and the aggregator is not able to
pay, the consumer will get reimbursement for his loss from the bank. See Sarah
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notwithstanding the current laws and regulations, generally: (1)
due to various payment processing associations' contractual
agreements and the charge-back rules between financial
institutions, the ultimate responsibility for absorbing the financial
loss in a number of the fact situations described in this Part III may
well rest with a financial institution other than the AHBank, (2)
due to various private contractual arrangements between financial
institutions and their corporate or business customers,
responsibility for loss may shift to that corporate orbusiness
customer, and (3) due to industry cooperative practices, an
AHBank may be able to obtain reimbursement (based upon
appropriate indemnification or legal protection by the AHBank)
from another financial institution that would then look to its
customer for reimbursement.
The following fact situations can arguably give rise to the
following simple legal answers-these answers assume that no
aggregation site has been used by the consumer. Part IV,
"EXCEPTIONS TO 'SIMPLE ANSWERS' (where the consumer has
arranged for aggregation)," will examine if and how the SIMPLE
ANSWERS change as a result of the consumer having authorized
aggregation by a third party.
A. Unauthorized ACH Debit Drawn on Checking Account
If the unauthorized transaction is caused by an Automated
Clearing House ("ACH") debit drawn against a checking account,
the AHBank is required to reimburse the consumer under the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA") and Regulation E ("Reg
Jane Hughes, Promoting the Use of Electronic Payments: What Role Will/Can
Consumer Protection Play?, Oct. 11, 2000, at 5 (paper presented at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Workshop on promoting the use of electronic
payments) (on file with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago). Banks and legal
commentators have expressed the generalized concern that:
Unlike vendors that the bank may supervise directly or commission to create a
product for the bank, third-party aggregators have no contractual relationships
or other allegiance to the bank and they cannot be required to warrant their
work or procure insurance, or to hold the bank harmless in case of error. For
this reason, I have a recurring nightmare that banks may keep the risk of liability
despite the inability to control this non-bank intermediary in any way...
Id. (emphasis added).
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E")!' This liability is subject to the AHBank's right to impose
limited liability upon the consumer depending upon the time
frames within which the consumer notifies it of the unauthorized
transaction or the loss or theft of the access device."
Further, the AHBank would have rights under the rules and
regulations governing the ACH Network ("ACH Rules") to
transmit an adjustment entry for the unauthorized debit to the
bank of first deposit ("ODFI"), again assuming that timing and
other technical requirements could be satisfied.53 The ODFI
probably would have contractual rights to charge-back the
unauthorized transaction to its customer.
B. Unauthorized Purchase on Credit Card Account
If the unauthorized transaction involves an unauthorized
merchandise purchase charged to a credit card account, the card
issuing financial institution is responsible for the loss under the
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and Regulation Z ("Reg Z").
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2001).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 16 9 3 g; 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (limiting the consumer's liability
for an unauthorized EFT to $50 if the consumer notifies the financial institution
within two business days of learning of the loss or theft of the access device). The
amount is limited to $500 if the consumer doesn't notify the AHBank within two
business days. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693g; 12 C.F.R. § 205.6. If a consumer fails to
report unauthorized EFTs that appear on a periodic statement, he can be held
liable for all unauthorized EFls that occur more than sixty days after the
transmittal of the first statement reflecting the unauthorized EFTs. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693g; 12 C.F.R. § 205.6. However, both Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard
International have adopted "zero liability" policies for debit card transactions
processed over their networks-online or off-whereby the consumer is not to be
held liable for any part of an unauthorized transaction. See Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
Zero Liability, at
http://www.usa.visa.com/personal/secure-withvisa/zerojliability.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2003);
http://www.mastercardintl.com/about/press/pressreleases.cgi?id=303.
53. See National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA), 2001
ACH Operating Rules § 7.7.1. The adjustment entry must be made no later than
the opening of business on the banking day following the sixtieth calendar day
following the settlement date of the original entry.
54. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1643, 1666; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.12, 226.13 (authorizing the
financial institution to hold the consumer responsible for the first $50 in
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However, that financial institution would frequently have rights
under the Visa and MasterCard charge-back rules to charge-back
the unauthorized transaction to the bank (merchant acquiring
bank) that acquired the transaction from its merchant customer,
again assuming that timing and other technical requirements had
been satisfied.5 The merchant acquiring bank probably would
have a contract with its merchant customer (merchant) giving it the
contractual right to charge-back the transaction to the merchant. 6
unauthorized transactions provided that certain procedural requirements are
complied with). Here again, both Visa U.S.A., Inc., and MasterCard
International have adopted "zero liability" policies whereby the consumer is not
to be held liable for the first dollar of unauthorized transactions. See supra note
52 and accompanying text.
55. See generally Visa U.S.A., Inc., Chargeback Management Guide for Visa
Merchants (2002), available at
http://www.usa.visa.com/media/business/chargeback-mgt.pdf. This Guide
explains the chargeback process and suggests preventive measures for merchants
to take to minimize their recurrence. Id. Chapter Seven deals with Potential
Fraud Chargebacks and Chapter Ten contains a summary description of the
chargeback process and a diagram illustrating that process. Id.
56. The terms of the merchant's relationship with its acquiring bank
(including the conditions under which the acquiring bank can chargeback a
transaction to the merchant) are typically spelled out in a processing contract
(the "merchant agreement"). Visa U.S.A., Inc. in an online communication
addressed to potential Visa merchants includes a list of questions the merchant
should ask before signing a processing contract. See Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
Merchants-Accepting Visa- Get an Account, at
http://www.usa.visa.com/business/merchants/get-anaccount-questions.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2003). Among the questions is whether it will be required to have
a certain percentage of its sales dollars or specific dollar amounts held by the
acquirer for chargebacks-this obviously assumes that the acquiring bank will
specify in the processing contract the conditions under which chargebacks will be
made. Id. Paymentech, L.P., a major merchant transaction processor, discusses
chargebacks at its Web site. See Paymentech Web site, available at
http://www.paymentech.net (last visited Apr. 2, 2003). The site includes an
"Operating Guide for Mail Order/Telephone Order/Internet Transactions." Id.
Section Five defines chargebacks as "the debiting of your Account or
withholding of settlement funds for all or part of the amount of a particular sale
as permitted by the Merchant Agreement." Id. Obviously, this also assumes that
a processing agreement spelling out chargeback rights will be in place between
the merchant and its acquiring bank.
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C. Forged Drawer Signature on Check
If the unauthorized transaction is caused by a forged drawer
signature or a counterfeit check drawn on a checking or open end
credit account, the AHBank that pays the check is responsible for
reimbursing the customer under the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC").57 Additionally, if the check is drawn against an open end
credit account (e.g., a cash advance check charged against a credit
card account), the billing error provisions of TILA and Reg Z
would require the AHBank to reimburse the consumer. 8 Further,
if the check had been converted to an electronic form of payment,
it would generally be considered an electronic funds transfer
("EFT") and the AHBank would be responsible for reimbursing
the customer under EFTA and Reg E.59
While there is no general legal right for the AHBank to
reverse the transaction under the processing rules for paper checks,
it is always possible for a financial institution to attempt a
consensual return to the depositary bank (a return without entry).
Thus, if funds remain on deposit in the original account into which
the forged or counterfeit check was deposited, the depositary bank
might be persuaded (with appropriate indemnification or other
protection such as a court order) to reverse the transaction and
recredit the payor bank. Additionally, if the check had been
converted to an electronic form of payment, the AHBank would
have the right to transmit the check back to the ODFI for
reimbursement under the ACH Rules, assuming that timing and
other technical requirements could be satisfied.'
57. See U.C.C. §§ 3-401, 3-403 (1996); see also HENRY J. BAILEY & RICHARD
B. HAGEDORN, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS: THE LAW OF BANK CHECKS ch. 28
(rev. ed. 1997).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666; 12 C.F.R. § 226.13.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693f, 1693g; 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.6, 205.11; Official Staff
Interpretations to Electronic Fund Transfer (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. pt. 205,
Supp. I, § 205.3(b)l.v.
60. See, e.g., National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA),
2001 ACH Operating Rules § 7.7.1 (concerning PPD Accounts Receivable
Truncated Check Debit Entries). The ODFI warrants that "all signatures on the
item to which the PPD debit entry relates are authentic and authorized." See
ACH Rule, § 2.9.3.4. If this warranty is breached, the ODFI indemnifies the
RDFI against all liability and expense "resulting directly or indirectly from the
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D. Identity Theft- Credit Account
If a financial institution suffers losses due to opening a credit
account for the perpetrator of an identity theft, that financial
institution would take the loss when charges are made against the
credit account and payments for those charges are not received.
The consumer whose name is stolen and used should generally
have no financial responsibility.6' However, despite having said
that, the consumer may well experience practical difficulties in
persuading the credit account issuing bank that identity theft was
involved in the opening of the account and in clearing his credit
report of information resulting from the identity theft.
E. Identity Theft-Asset Account
If a checking or other deposit account is opened for the
perpetrator of an identity theft, the financial institution that opens
the account generally takes any resulting losses (e.g., if deposits
into that account are returned unpaid and no funds remain on
deposit in the account to offset against).62 Again the consumer
breach .... ACH Rule, § 2.9.3.11. The RDFI has the right to transmit an
adjustment entry to the ODFI providing that technical requirements are met not
later than the opening of business on the banking day following the sixtieth
calendar day following the Settlement Date of the Debit Entry. See ACH Rule, §
7.7.13(2). If an electronified check were presented under the POP (point-of-
purchase) program, general ACH Rules would provide for similar adjustment
entries in the event of an unauthorized transaction. See ACH Rule § 7.7.1.
61. Though this issue has not been settled, the federal government and many
states are considering bills to explicitly hold financial institutions liable to
consumers for losses suffered from identity theft. See Security: The Politics of
Identity Are Stirring, FUTURE BANKER, Oct. 2001, at 10. This type of protection
can be observed in the protection provided to a consumer when an imposter
succeeds in validating an unsolicited access device to a financial institutions
failure to correctly verify the consumer's identity. See Official Staff
Interpretations to Electronic Fund Transfer (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. pt. 205,
Supplement I, § 205.5(b)4.
62. The most likely scenario here would probably be the deposit into an
account opened by the thief of stolen checks payable to a real consumer bearing
an endorsement made by the thief. Under the UCC, a bank which accepts a
check for deposit warrants that all signatures on the item are authentic and
authorized. See U.C.C. § 4-207 (1996). If this warranty is breached, the
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whose name is stolen and used should generally have no financial
responsibility; however, he may experience practical difficulties in
clearing his credit records and dealing with the financial institution.
Table 1 below summarizes the SIMPLE ANSWERS described in this
Part.
An additional issue is whether reimbursement to the innocent
consumer will include reimbursement of fees imposed by the
AHBank (e.g., Non-Sufficient Funds ("NSF") check fees in
connection with legitimate checks bounced as a result of
unauthorized transactions drawing down the funds in a checking
account). Reasonable business practices as well as regulatory
requirements should cause this to happen.63 Less clear is whether
the AHBank will reimburse the consumer for charges imposed by
other third parties as a result of problems created by erroneous or
unauthorized transactions (e.g., bounced check fees imposed by a
retailer on a check returned because an account was drained of
funds by unauthorized transactions)."
depository bank is responsible for reimbursing the payor bank (and any other
collecting banks) based upon the breach of its warranty. Id.
63. Under both Regulation E and Regulation Z, the consumer alleging an
unauthorized transaction would be entitled to be credited for interest and fees
imposed by the AHBank. See Official Staff Interpretations to Electronic Fund
Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, Supp.I, § 205.11(c)6; Reg Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226.13(e)1 (2001). However, the AHBank is apparently not able to
charge-back the amount of such finance charges or fees to the ODFI or
merchant-acquiring bank under existing ACH or credit card charge-back rules.
64. Under U.C.C. § 4-402 (1996), a payor bank that wrongfully dishonors a
check is liable to its customer for damages "proximately caused" by dishonor of
the check. Id. With respect to unauthorized EFTs, reimbursement is not required
by the error resolution requirements of Regulation E and is arguably not
required under the billing error resolution requirements of Regulation Z. See
Official Staff Commentary to Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, Supp. I,
§205.11(c)6; Reg Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(e)1. However, an individual AHBank
may consider such reimbursement prudent as a relatively small concession to
terminate contentious discussions with aggrieved consumers; it may consider such
reimbursement required by the U.C.C. if the unauthorized transaction (either
EFT or forged check) caused the wrongful dishonor (bouncing) of a legitimate
check and the fee is connected to that wrongful dishonor.
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Table 1: Summary of Simple Answers As to liability for
Unauthorized Transactions Where a Customer Has No Aggregation
Arrangement
Type of Transaction Is the AHBank Does the AHBank have Does the consumer have
responsible for any contractual/legal responsibility under the
loss under the law? charge-back rights? law for any financial loss?
A. Unauthorized ACH debit Yes Yes-to bank Maybe-up to
drawn on checking account* of first deposit limited amounts
B. Unauthorized purchase Yes Yes-to merchant Maybe-up to
on credit card amount** acquiring bank limited amounts
C. Forged drawer signature Yes No-not unless the No
on check*** check has been
converted to an
electronic form of
payment
D. Identity theft-credit Yes No No
card account
E. Identity theft-asset Yes No No
account
Notes to Table 1:
*Under the EFTA and Reg E, the AHBank is generally liable for an unauthorized ACH debit drawn
on a checking account; subject, however, to certain limited liability that can be shifted to the consumer.
Consumer liability s limited to $50 if the consumer notifies the AHBank within two business days of learning
of the loss or theft of an access device. It is limited to $500 if the consumer doesn't notify the AHBank within
two business days. If a consumer fails to report unauthorized EFTs that appear on a periodic statement, he
can be held liable for all unauthorized EFTs that occur more than 60 days after the transmittal of the first
statement reflecting an unauthorized EFT. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693g; 12 C.F.R. § 205.6. However, both Visa
U.S.A. and MasterCard International have adopted "zero liability" policies for debit card transactions
processed over their networks-under these policies the consumer is not to be held liable for the first dollar of
unauthorized transactions. See http://www.usa.visa.com/personallsecurewithvisa/zeroliability.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2003); http://www.mastercardintl.com/about/press/pressreleases.cgi?id=303.
**TILA and Reg Z generally put liability for unauthorized credit card transactions upon the AHBank.
However, the AHBank is authorized to hold the consumer responsible for the first $50 provided that certain
procedural requirements are complied with. 15 U.S.C. sections 1643 and 1666; 12 C.F.R. sections 226.12 and
226.13. Again, both Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard International have adopted "zero liability" policies for
unauthorized credit card transactions.
***The AHB bank which pays a forged drawer check is responsible for reimbursing the customer
under the UCC sections 3-401 and 3-403. Additionally, if the check is drawn against an open end credit
account, the billing error provisions of TILA and Reg Z require the AHBank to reimburse the consumer. See
15 U.S.C. § 1666; 12 C.F.R. § 226.13. Further if the check was converted to an electronic form of payment, it
would generally be considered an EFT and the AHBank would be responsible for reimbursing the customer
under the EFTA and Regulation E. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693f, 1693g; 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.6, 205.11; Official Staff
Commentary to Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, Supp. 1, § 205.3(b)l.v. If the unauthorized check was
converted to an electronic form of payment, it could be transmitted back to the originating bank for
reimbursement under the ACH rules, assuming that timing and other technical requirements could be
satisfied. See, e.g., National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA), 2001 ACH Operating Rules
(ACH Rules) (concerning PPD Accounts Receivable Truncated Check Debit Entries and the POP Point-of-
Purchase program).
582 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO SIMPLE ANSWERS WHERE THE CONSUMER HAS
ARRANGED FOR AGGREGATION
The following must be remembered when analyzing whether
the presence of an aggregation relationship changes the SIMPLE
ANSWERS: simply because a consumer has signed up for aggregation
and suffers some type of unauthorized transaction against a
financial account does not mean that the cause of the unauthorized
transaction was the consumer's involvement with, or providing
information to, an aggregation site. For example, fraud on credit
card accounts has been around since the inception of credit card
lending-dumpster divers, bad merchants, bad credit card issuer's
employees, fraud rings hacking into merchant databases, and other
bad actors have all been involved in obtaining information about
consumer's credit card accounts and using that information'to
conduct fraudulent transactions on those accounts. Simply because
aggregation has appeared on the landscape does not mean that all
credit card fraud is now attributable to the consumer's having
arranged for account aggregation. Fraud in connection with
consumer financial accounts is quite large65-reported fraud in
connection with enrollment in aggregation sites has thus far been
virtually nonexistent.66
For aggregation to be relevant in determining who has liability
for an unauthorized transaction, the AHBank must realize that the
consumer has arranged for aggregation and then be able to prove
that aggregation has some relevant connection to the fraud. With
aggregation in its infancy and having relatively few users, it will
probably not be a factor in the near future for most claims that a
transaction is unauthorized. However, if at some future point
aggregation is implicated frequently when unauthorized
transactions appear, then utilization of an aggregation service
might start appearing on an AHBank's checklist of facts to look for
when a fraudulent transaction occurs.
According to the SIMPLE ANSWERS: (1) the customer generally
65. For example, Visa and MasterCard reported $576.3 million in fraud
losses as of
1/1/98. CARD INDUSTRY DIRECTORY 15 (Faulkner & Gray, Inc. 2000).
66. The author has been advised by a representative of Yodlee that to his
knowledge such fraud has been nonexistent. See Yodlee Interview, supra note 2.
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has rights under existing laws/regulations to reimbursement when
an unauthorized transaction is made against his financial account;
(2) the AHBank will generally be the party initially responsible for
reimbursement under the existing laws/regulations; (3) the
AHBank may have contractual rights under ACH Rules or
payment processing association rules to charge-back this loss to
another financial institution; and (4) that financial institution may
have contractual rights to reimbursement from its customer.
Assuming that aggregation evolves in such a way that aggregation
sites become the sources of information used to commit some
unauthorized transactions, this Part will address whether the
SIMPLE ANSWERS change where an AHBank believes that the
source of the information used in the unauthorized transaction was
an aggregation site. Table 2, below, sets forth simple conclusions
as to whether the SIMPLE ANSWERS change when an aggregation
relationship is implicated in connection with an unauthorized
transaction.
Table 2: Exceptions to Simple Answers Where the Consumer Has
Arranged for Aggregation
Does the SIMPLE ANSWER change if
the consumer has arranged for
Type of transaction aggregation?
A. Unauthorized ACH debit drawn on Maybe (See Tables 3 & 4 below)
checking account
B. Unauthorized purchase on credit Maybe (See Tables 3 & 4 below)
card account
C. Forged drawer signature on check No
D. Identity theft-credit card account No
E. Identity theft-asset account No
A. "Worst Case" Scenario
The worst case scenario from both the AHBank's and its
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customer's perspective is if the customer's user ID or password is
used to enter the AHBank's online banking site and initiate the
unauthorized transaction, transferring money from the customer's
account at the AHBank to another bank (a "credit push"
transaction). As a practical matter, SIMPLE ANSWERS A and B may
both change in terms of whether the customer is protected and who
is ultimately liable.
In this situation, appropriate resolution is confusing and
uncertain at best." The basic problem is that many factual issues
must be resolved prior to the AHBank reaching a conclusion as to
its legal responsibilities. The conclusion will be largely dependent
on the facts in each case. The AHBank will have no rights of
charge-back under ACH or credit card association rules." The
67. The difficulty in appropriately assessing liability is captured in this
excerpt from a question and answer session at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Workshop on Promoting the Use of Electronic Payments, at 140 (Oct.
11, 2000) (transcript on file with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago):
Audience Member: You mentioned in your paper that the bank could be found
liable for account aggregation even though the customer provides the
information, the number, PIN, et cetera, and the bank does not even know they
have done that and yet could be held liable. I have heard that a number of
times. I wonder how that is the case.
Sarah Jane Hughes (Professor Indiana University School of Law): I do not
think there is a law on that subject .... I think it is a question of proof and
whose fault it is. On one level it is the customer's fault for disclosing
information that should be guarded. But we never know whether it is a
participant failure, participant error, system issue, electrical outage. And we
have had examples over the last 15 years of payment issue problems that are
related to electrical outages. We do not know whether there is a hacker. We
just have a lot of difficulty proving fraud.
From the consumer's perspective it is incredibly difficult to show where an
error occurred. It is comparable to one of us looking at a car that has many
embedded computers in it and pointing to the one that is not working correctly
... and from the consumer's perspective the cost of finding someone to help
penetrate this problem is enormous. I think we have to consider the prospect
that a jury is going to be deciding this, and that the jury is highly likely to
assume that the error is not the consumer's error but somebody else's in the
system. And we also have the tendency to look for the deepest pocket to assign
the loss to .... So it suggests to us that we need to consider how we are going to
insure ourselves ....
Id.
68. The AHBank in this scenario is acting upon what it believes to be its
consumer customer's instruction in initiating the transaction. Its role is that of
transaction originator (comparable to the originator in the ACH system and the
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AHBank's right of reimbursement from the aggregator or
aggregation technology provider ("ATP") will be matters for
negotiation and fact dependent. In such a heavily fact dependent
scenario, it is impossible to conclude with any certainty what a
specific AHBank, aggregator or ATP would do vis-A-vis assuming
liability-the parties could spend many hours arguing over (1)
whether the transaction was unauthorized or whether the customer
was involved (i.e., a "friendly fraud"), (2) if unauthorized, who the
fraudster was, and (3) what the source of the information used to
make the unauthorized transaction was. However, the basic laws,
regulations and common law may already provide the basis for
liability determinations in most cases-the specific facts determine
what result is reached in applying those laws, regulations and
common law principles. The following paragraphs will detail how
an AHBank might approach such a complaint by its customer and
illustrate the complex factual issues facing the parties.
The AHBank's first reaction may be that, since the customer's
password and/or user ID was used to initiate the transaction, the
customer or someone that he authorized must have initiated the
transaction. One might assume that the customer had simply
forgotten that he had initiated the transaction and there would
probably be an attempt to get the customer to remember it. The
customer might be asked who else has access to the account that
might have initiated the transaction. He would be asked how
someone else might have obtained his secret information: did he
write it down somewhere (and, if so, where); does a relative or
friend know the information; does he use the same password or
user ID for other applications; has he provided the secret
information to a financial advisor; or, perhaps, has he provided it
to an aggregation site. The AHBank might attempt to determine a
connection between the customer and the recipient of the funds.
In this murky fact situation, the AHBank might reach a conclusion
based on sketchy and imperfect information as to how the
transaction occurred; the inclination, even after a lengthy
merchant in the credit card system) vis-a-vis either the ACH or the credit card
processing systems. The processing systems' rules generally provide for
chargebacks against the originator or the merchant, not for chargebacks by either
of them.
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investigation, might still be to conclude that the AHBank
considered the transaction authorized and to advise the customer
that it was resolving the issue against him. 69  Alternatively, the
AHBank might determine that the transaction was unauthorized
and that (1) the most probable source of the fraud is information
provided to the aggregation site, (2) there was another identifiable
source of the information, or (3) it has no idea whatsoever as to the
source of the fraud or information.
If the AHBank concluded that the unauthorized transaction
was connected to an aggregation site, it may try to judge how the
secret information had been obtained from the aggregation site-
whether by a hacker, by a dishonest employee of the aggregator or
the ATP, or by the aggregator itself. In the simple situation where
a dishonest aggregator was the fraudster, SIMPLE ANSWER A might
change as the AHBank would have a basis under Reg E for
refusing to reimburse the customer." The basis for shifting liability
to the customer is created by language in Reg E which indicates
that where a customer furnishes his access device (e.g., the
username and PIN) to a third party (e.g., the aggregator), the
customer is fully liable for transfers made by the third party unless
he has notified the AHBank that transfers by the third party are no
longer permitted." Informal comments from Federal Reserve
Board of Governors ("FRB") staff indicate that this argument
would be correct only if the customer had originally authorized the
aggregator to perform EFT transactions. If the aggregator was not
originally authorized to do EFT transactions, even this very limited
69. Both Regulation E and Regulation Z require an AHBank to
"investigate" an alleged unauthorized transaction. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.11(c),
226.13(f) (2001). They do not require the AHBank to always believe the
allegation nor do they define in detail what is or is not adequate proof that a
transaction is unauthorized. See id. § 205.11(c), 226.13(f). This remains a fact
question for determination by the AHBank. See id. §§ 205.11(c)-(d), 226.12(b),
226.13(f). Having said this, in making the factual determination, the AHBank
must remember that both the EFTA and TILA place the burden of proof on the
AHBank to show that the EFT or credit card transaction was authorized. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1693g(b), 1643(b) (1994).
70. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(m)(1); Official Staff Interpretations to Regulation
E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, Supp. I, § 205.2(m)(2).
71. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(m)(1); Official Staff Interpretations to Regulation
E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, Supp. I, § 205.2(m)(2).
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basis for refusing to reimburse the customer should be eliminated.
What does it mean to say that the aggregator was the
fraudster? If the AHBank refused reimbursement under the
aggregator-as-fraudster scenario, it is inevitable that the question
would come up as to who is the aggregator-specifically, how far
can Reg E be stretched to provide a basis for the AHBank to
refuse to reimburse the customer if the actual fraudster was a high
level employee of the aggregator, a low level employee, the ATP,
or one of the ATP's employees? Who among these would be
considered the "aggregator" whom the customer authorized to
make EFT transactions when he signed up for the aggregation
service? While the AHBank might argue that each of these parties
should be considered the "aggregator," its right to refuse
reimbursement on this basis is less than clear under Reg E and
would be a matter of dispute.72
If the account accessed is a credit account, SIMPLE ANSWER B
does not change vis-A-vis liability to the customer: the AHBank
does not have a legitimate argument under specific language of
Reg Z for refusing reimbursement simply because the aggregator
or one of its employees/agents was the fraudster.73
If the fraudster was a hacker, it is hard to find a basis for the
AHBank to refuse reimbursement under either Reg E or Reg Z.7
This "worst case" scenario would not be relevant or applicable
in the situations described in SIMPLE ANSWERS C, D, or E.
If the AHBank reimburses its customer in a situation involving
a credit push, it has no rights of charge-back under the ACH rules
72. See Official Staff Interpretations to Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205,
Supp. I, § 205.2(m)(1). A consumer has no liability for erroneous or fraudulent
transfers initiated by an employee of a financial institution. Id. The consumer
might attempt to use these words against the aggregator (or perhaps even its
AHBank) should an aggregator fit within the Regulation E definition of a
"financial institution" and the fraudster be the aggregator's employee. It is
unlikely that the comment was originally written to be applied in this manner
against an AHBank. Nonetheless, the words are arguably broad enough to be so
applied, and neither the words of Regulation E, nor the Commentary attempt to
allocate liability between the AHBank and the Aggregator in this situation.
73. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.12, 226.13.
74. See Official Staff Interpretations to Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205,
Supp. I, § 205.6(b)(2) (clarifying that consumer negligence does not provide a
basis for refusing reimbursement).
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or the card processing association rules because the AHBank itself
was the party taking instructions from a fraudster." However, the
AHBank may obtain reimbursement from (1) the recipient
financial institution if it will voluntarily cooperate in removing
funds from the fraudster's account (should any remain on deposit)
on the basis of indemnification or other protection, (2) the
fraudster through litigation or other means, or (3) the aggregator
or the ATP.
Theories on which to base a claim for reimbursement from the
aggregator or ATP would include reimbursement based on
contractual rights if the AHBank had an agreement with either one
for reimbursement (e.g., in a data feed or aggregation site
agreement) should losses be attributable to an AHBank customer
having provided information to the aggregation site. The problem
that the AHBank still faces is providing "proof" that the
aggregation site was the source of the information used in making
the fraudulent transaction. The aggregator or ATP might require
more in the way of "proof" than the AHBank had been willing to
request from its good customer.
Alternatively, if no contractual relationship existed, the
AHBank could attempt to obtain reimbursement based on alleged
negligence. In a given situation, the aggregator or ATP might find
it advantageous to reimburse the AHBank in order to avoid (1) the
time and money involved in litigation, (2) creating bad precedent
in an unfavorable fact situation, or (3) negative press as to the
safety and security of the aggregation service.
While the above described "worst case" scenario does not give
rise to clear or simple answers,76 it is hard to identify any benefit
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., OCC, supra note 28 (describing the potential exposure to
liability under Regulation E when AHBanks provide their customers with
usernames and passwords for electronic banking). The potential exposure arises
when their customer shares those usernames and passwords with an aggregator.
If an attacker then steals the usernames and passwords from the aggregator and
performs unauthorized transactions, it is unclear under the current regulation
which party would bear responsibility for an unauthorized transaction. Id. at 4.
The OCC also provided the following caution when a national bank is acting as
aggregator:
In aggregating customer information, banks should closely monitor regulatory
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from or need for the enactment of additional laws, regulations or
interpretations at this time. Specifically, such identification is
difficult given the fact intensive nature of any dispute under this
scenario and the absence of a real life factual basis for concluding
that existing law is not sufficient to handle most problems that may
arise. Table 3 attempts to set forth the author's conclusions as to
who is responsible for absorbing the financial loss in several
possible fact situations. It must be emphasized that without a real
life fact pattern significant ambiguities exist in the examples given
and parties may differ as to the outcomes.77
changes in the application of Regulation E. Currently Regulation E ... does
not specifically address the responsibilities of aggregators .... Aggregators that
also provide electronic fund transfer services could come within the current
coverage of Regulation E in two ways. If the aggregator is a bank, and holds
consumer accounts in the bank, the aggregator is covered by Regulation E
when it agrees with the consumer to provide electronic fund transfer services to
or from the account. Aggregator banks that do not hold the consumer's
account could also fall within the coverage of Regulation E. An aggregator
bank may be covered if it issues a card, PIN or other access device to the
consumer and agrees to provide electronic fund transfer services with respect to
accounts at other institutions. If the aggregator bank does not have an
agreement with these other institutions concerning the electronic fund transfer
services, a special set of rules under Regulation E for 'service providers' will
apply. Banks and aggregation service providers should consider the possibility
that providing customers with an automatic log-in feature to conduct electronic
fund transfers on other entities' Web sites could trigger the application of
Regulation E ....
Id. at 4; see also Ronald Congemi, Regulation of Aggregators Needs More
Uniformity, AM. BANKER, Oct. 13, 2000, at 17; John Jin Lee, Lee: Repair
Inadequate Aggregation Regs, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 2000, at 14A.
77. As artfully stated by Star Systems, Inc. in its August 2000 report on
aggregation in a section entitled Consumer Protection: The Legal and Regulatory
Landscape:
It comes as no surprise that even the Internet-savvy consumers surveyed for
STAR are confused about the regulatory implications of Web aggregation. It is
such a new and dynamic area that definitions of law and delineations of
responsibility are continually evolving, and new questions arise as quickly as
others are answered. What is true today is likely to be vastly out-of-date by
year's end. The best anyone can do at this point is to paint as complete a
picture as possible of the current, hazy landscape and to make an educated
prediction of what lies ahead.
Letter from Paul Schmelzer, Executive Vice President Star Systems, Inc. to
Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System Re Docket R-1074 (Sept. 5, 2000) (on file with the FRB) [hereinafter
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Table 3*: Worst Case Scenario - "Credit Push" Transaction Where
the Customer Has Arranged for Aggregation
Fact situation: Consumer's user ID/password is used to enter the AHBank's
online banking site and initiate the unauthorized transaction, transferring money from
his account at the AHBank to another bank.
Tvoe of Transaction
Is the AHBank
responsible for
loss under the
Law?
Does the AHBank have Does the consumer have
any contractual responsibility under the
charge back rights? law for any financial
loss?
A. Unauthorized ACH debit drawn Appropriate resolution is confusing and uncertain-conclusion will be
on checking accountlargely dependent on the facts in each case.
A.1 Aggregator was the fraudster, In A.1 the "SIMPLE ANSWERS" change as follows:
AND
Customer has authorized aggregator No N.A. Consumer must look to
to perform EFT transactions aggregator for reimburse-
ment
A.2 Aggregator was the fraudster, The "SIMPLE ANSWER" does not change in A.2 as to who
AND is liable as between the AHBank and the customer; it does change with
Customer has NOT authorized the respect to whether the AHBank has any charge-back rights
Aggregator to perform EF' transactions
Yes No+ Maybe-up to limited
amounts (See* at Table 1)
A.3 Aggregator employee. ATP, or
ATP employee was the fraudster,
AND Customer has authorized the
aggregator to perform EF'
transactions
A.4 Aggregator employee, ATP, or
ATP employee was the fraudster,
AND the customer has not
authorized the aggregator to
perform EFr transactions
A.5 The fraudster was a hacker
B. Unauthorized transaction
)n credit card account
Unclear in A.3 whether the "SIMPLE ANSWERS" change-the AHBank
might argue that the parties listed should be considered the
"aggregator;" its right to refuse reimbursement on this basis is less
than clear under EFrA and would be a matter of dispute
The "SIMPLE ANSWER" does not change in A.4 as to
who is liable as between the AHBank and the consumer; it does change
with respect to whether the AHBank has any charge-back rights
Yes No+ Maybe-up to limited
amounts (See * at Table 1)
The "SIMPLE ANSWER" does not change in A.5 as to
who is liable as between the AHBank and the consumer; it does change with
respect to whether the AHBank has any charge-back rights
Yes No+ Maybe-up to limited
amounts (See * at Table I)
The "SIMPLE ANSWER" does not change in this fact situation as to
who is liable as between the AHBank and the consumer; it does change with
respect to whether the AHBank has any charge-back rights
Yes No+ Maybe-up to limited
amounts (see**at Table 1)
*DISCLAIMER: This Table reflects the author's preliminary views in connection with a developing business and
technology product. Business, technology and laws are subject to changes in substance and interpretation. As the business and
technology evolves, the legal analysis may also change and evolve.
Schmelzer letter] (enclosing Star Systems, Inc. report titled WEB AGGREGATION,
A SNAPSHOT).
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B. Debit Transactions
With "debit" transactions, the unauthorized transaction would
be initiated through a financial institution or retail merchant and
would take the form of either an ACH debit, or a debit card/credit
card charge (debit) against the customer's account. Examples of
this situation might occur if a bad aggregator or hacker accessed an
aggregation site and obtained the customer's credit card or debit
card account information together with other personal
information. The bad aggregator/hacker might create a counterfeit
card using the information and use it at a retail merchant to
consummate a fraudulent transaction. Alternatively, the
information might be used without creating a card to do a
telephone order with a merchant or a transaction over the Internet.
The threshold issue with any such transaction, again, is how to
identify and prove that the unauthorized transaction had any
relationship to the customer's involvement with an aggregation
site.
1. Unauthorized Transactions Initiated BY a Bad Aggregator
Such a scenario might involve the bad aggregator (or its
merchant partner) having a retail business unrelated to the
aggregation site, through which the aggregator could submit sales
drafts or ACH authorizations for retail purchases. Should this
scenario surface and the consumer complain to his AHBank, the
standard ACH or credit card or debit card contractual charge-back
mechanisms should work to place liability upon the
ODFI/merchant acquiring bank which acquired the transaction
from the aggregator (or his merchant partner); typically, the
ODFI/merchant acquiring bank would then have the contractual
right to charge-back to its merchant customer, i.e., here the bad
aggregator (or its merchant partner). If for some reason the
normal charge-back mechanisms did not work, the specific type of
fraudulent transaction involved determines whether arguments can
be successfully raised by the AHBank that it should not be liable to
the customer.
As previously described in the "worst case" scenario, a
regulatory basis for insisting that the customer should bear
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financial responsibility vis-A-vis the AHBank only exists with
respect to unauthorized EFT transactions drawn on an asset
account by a bad aggregator." Thus, SIMPLE ANSWER A may
change. It should be noted that raising this issue in the first
instance, prior to attempting charge-back/reversal, may generally
complicate rather than simplify the situation from both the
customer's and the AHBank's perspectives. Both may be more
assured of reimbursement if the AHBank simply recredits the
customer's account and charges-back the unauthorized debit; this
should also reduce customer dissatisfaction with the AHBank and
leave the customer with only a relatively small risk of ultimately
bearing the loss. Only if this reimbursement and charge-
back/reversal fails may it make much practical sense for the
AHBank to deny compensation to the consumer, forcing the
consumer to deal with the aggregator. One should keep in mind
that this "bad aggregator" fact scenario becomes less likely the
more often that the entities providing aggregation sites are
financial institutions or other established businesses.
In the case of unauthorized credit card transactions, the
customer should not bear financial losses and no such successful
arguments by the AHBank to the contrary appear likely. Thus
SIMPLE ANSWER B would not change. The debit transaction fact
situation described in this Part is not relevant in connection with
transactions resulting from counterfeit/forged checks or the
opening of accounts based upon identity theft. Thus SIMPLE
ANSWERS C, D, and E would not change.79
78. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(m)(1); Official Staff Interpretations to Regulation
E 12, C.F.R. pt. 205, Supp. I, § 205.2(m)(2).
79. TILA and Regulation Z require the AHBank to reimburse the consumer
for unauthorized transactions-no exceptions are made for transactions enabled
by the negligence of the consumer. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1643, 1666 (1994); 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.12, 226.13. With respect to identity fraud, litigation against the real
consumer based upon the theory that he enabled the fraud by negligent
disclosure of information to the aggregator would need to be proved-this is a
non-starter with no realistic possibility of success. With respect to counterfeit
checks drawn against a real deposit account in the name of the real consumer, it
is possible that the AHBank could refuse to reimburse the consumer based on
some very tortured negligence theory (e.g., that the consumer had enabled the
fraudulent transaction by negligently providing private information to the
aggregator). However, given the liability for consequential damages which an
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2. Unauthorized Transactions Initiated By a Hacker or Other
Third Party
If losses involving debit pull transactions were due to
unauthorized transactions by a hacker who accessed information at
the aggregation site, the customer should be made whole by his
AHBank. The customer has not authorized the hacker to use the
information; any alleged negligence by the customer in disclosing
his secret information to the aggregation site should not be
relevant to the liability determination under either Reg E or Reg
Z.
8 0
If it were possible to tie the losses to negligent practices at the
aggregation site, it might be possible for the AHBank, the
merchant acquiring bank, or the ODFI that processed the
transaction for the hacker (or for the merchant that accepted the
transaction from the hacker) to attempt to impose some sort of
liability on the aggregator. However, unless significant dollars are
involved this would appear quite unlikely given the difficulties in
proving the source of the information used in the fraud or such
negligence. Additionally, if flaws (negligence) could be found in
the practices of the financial institution that had either entered into
a contractual arrangement with the hacker or that had opened an
account for the hacker based on identity fraud, it is somewhat
unlikely that those institutions would want to expose their own
weak or flawed processes in attempting to recover from the
AHBank has for wrongful dishonor of the real customer's checks and for
conversion, the considerable time and effort that would be required to proceed
with such flimsy theories, and that the probability of success is remote, this would
not appear to be an intelligent or cost effective approach.
80. See Official Staff Interpretations to Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, Supp
I, § 205.6(b)(2).
Has the aggregator been hacked and somebody was able to pull up the PIN and
the account number and use it? If so, I think the law is quite clear, the
customer is not responsible. The customer can write the PIN on the back of
their ATM card and leave it on the bus and they are still not responsible. We
are very protective of the consumer. I think a different question is whether the
aggregator itself exceeded its authority to use the data.
David Teitelbaum, Remarks at the Workshop on Promoting the Use of
Electronic Payments 141 (Oct. 11, 2000) (transcript on file with the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago).
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aggregator.
Table 4 attempts to set forth the author's conclusions as to
who is responsible for absorbing the financial loss in connection
with debit transactions where an aggregation site has been utilized
at some point by the customer and is implicated in the transaction.
Again, it must be emphasized that without a real life fact pattern
significant ambiguities exist in the examples given and parties may
differ as to the outcomes.
Table 4: Unauthorized Debit Transactions Where the Customer Has
Arranged for Aggregation
Fact Situation: An unauthorized transaction is initiated
through a financial institution or retail merchant and takes the
form of either an ACH debit or a debit card/credit card charge (a
"debit" transaction). For example, a bad aggregator or hacker
accesses an aggregation site and obtains the customer's credit card
or debit card account information together with other personal
information and uses that information to do a transaction at a
merchant site.
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Type of Transaction Is the AHBank
responsible for
loss under the
law?
Does the AHBank have
any contractual
charge back rights?
Consumer
responsibility
for any financial
loss?
A. Unauthorized ACH Appropriate resolution is largely dependent on the facts in each case.
debit drawn on checking
account
A.1 Aggregator was In A.1 the "SIMPLE ANSWERS" change as follows:
the fraudster AND
Customer has No N.A.
authorized aggregator
to perform EFT transactions*
Consumer must look to
aggregator for
reimbursement
[*As a practical matter, if the AHBank chooses to ignore its "legal rights" and assist the consumer, it
would probably be able to charge back the transaction to the bank of first deposit which would then
probably obtain reimbursement from its depositor-the AHBank's customer would be made whole and
loss would probably fall upon the aggregator or the party processing the transaction for the aggregator]
A.2 The fraudster was The "SIMPLE ANSWERS" do not change
a hacker or other
third party
B. Unauthorized
purchase on credit
card account
Yes-to the bank of
first deposit
The "SIMPLE ANSWERS" do not change
Yes-to merchant
acquiring bank
Maybe-up to
limited amounts
(See * at Table 1)
Maybe-up to
limited amount
(See ** on Table 1)
C. Practical Considerations
One very important practical consideration to keep in mind is
that the answers outlined above and the legal rights provided by
the various applicable laws, regulations, and contractual
arrangements, do not necessarily mean that the consumer will be
made whole. Of primary importance is whether the customer is
credible when he claims that the transaction is unauthorized. If
not, the AHBank will determine that no unauthorized transaction
occurred and probably will not reimburse him voluntarily.
Additionally, the customer's reimbursement also will depend on
whether the AHBank knows the law and whether its counsel
interprets existing consumer protection laws conservatively or
aggressively.
Since neither statutory or regulatory language nor the
interpretation of facts are ever 100% clear, an aggressive attorney
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might well parse words or interpret facts differently and reach
different conclusions than those outlined in this Article. However,
assuming that the AHBank and its counsel take a conservative
approach, just as important is whether the customer service staff
understands what the law requires. If the customer service staff
does not understand that claims of unauthorized transactions must
be resolved as required by law and that procedures are specified
for their resolution under both Reg E and Reg Z, then a claim may
not be investigated or resolved."1
Given the endless permutations that can be thought up when
dealing with hypothetical situations (which is the only approach
available unless an AHBank has real life experience with or actual
knowledge of reality and common factual situations), arriving at
the correct answers for who has liability when an unauthorized
transaction is related to the provision of information to an
aggregation site is a very complex issue." Consequently,
reasonable business people might conclude, based upon a cost-
benefit analysis, that it is simply not worth attempting to determine
the appropriate resolution of all conceivable fact situations or to
train the customer service staff in all possible nuances. Rather a
more practical approach might be to simply establish thresholds
(i.e., the lesser of X dollars or Y claims). As long as the thresholds
are not exceeded, customer claims of unauthorized transactions
would result in customer reimbursement and be handled under
standard charge-back, reversal, or write-off policies irrespective of
81. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.6, 226.13.
82. The authors of a recent BUSINESs LAWYER article on developments in
cyberbanking discussed liability issues concerning aggregation in the following
terms:
As aggregation services have increased in popularity, questions have arisen
under Regulation E, which implements the Electronic fund Transfer Act, and
Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act, as to whether the
consumer, the aggregator, or the account holding financial institution would be
liable for fraudulent transfers initiated by either an employee of an aggregator
or by a hacker who gains access to the aggregator's Web site. More specifically,
a key unresolved issue is whether fraudulent transfers are unauthorized
transfers when, for example, the consumer has furnished the aggregator with a
PIN or access code, and therefore, it is not clear which party should bear the
loss for such transfers.
Lee S. Adams & David J. Martz, Developments in Cyberbanking, 57 Bus. LAW
1257, 1265 (2002).
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whether information had been provided by the customer to an
aggregation site. If the threshold were reached, it might begin to
make economic sense to devote the time and energy to figuring out
technical rights based upon experience with real life situations. If
problems arise infrequently and involve relatively small amounts of
money, the cost of analysis and training may far exceed the costs of
any write-offs.
Additional factual considerations, such as the amount of the
potential loss, may be determinative of whether the customer is
reimbursed. If a small amount is involved, a concession and
reimbursement may be quickly made without much thought by
either the AHBank or the aggregator, both of whom may have a
policy of reimbursing small losses irrespective of technical
responsibility in order to limit expenses for staff time (or to limit
the size of a class in a potential class action lawsuit). If large
amounts are involved, there would tend to be a more careful
examination of statutory/regulatory provisions and technical
defenses.
Further, if funds cannot be recovered through charge-back or
reversal mechanisms, losses may simply be absorbed by various
financial institutions as a cost of doing business. Procedures may
develop to limit the possibilities of such fraud (e.g., by refusing to
participate in data feed arrangements and getting aggressive in
limiting screen-scraping activities) or the increased costs of fraud
resulting from the concentration of information at aggregation sites
may simply be priced into the amounts charged to consumers for
general banking services (or priced into those services for the
customers who choose to use aggregation). Alternatively, a
financial institution or other data site might decide to enter into a
data feed arrangement if it were possible to negotiate an
assumption of responsibility by the aggregator for fraud
transactions tied to information provided to the aggregator.
Whether litigation will develop to shift responsibility for fraud
losses to aggregators depends on whether significant dollars can be
identified and proven lost due to the negligence of the aggregator. 3
83. While Regulation E in some fact situations might be read to place
responsibility on an aggregator to resolve an alleged error raised by a consumer,
Regulation E does not generally provide a clear roadmap as to how liability is to
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To the extent that the aggregation site has followed procedures
common in the industry and the industry is largely populated by
large financial institutions or other large corporate entities, proving
negligence may be difficult. If litigation develops, it is not possible
to predict the outcome with certainty. Given the costs of litigation,
the possibility of using it to resolve aggregator liability issues
appears unlikely in the absence of a significant level of loss.
Additionally, the AHBank seeking to shift liability to an
aggregator may also operate an aggregation site-it may be that it
would prefer to absorb a significant loss rather than to create
precedent that others might use to attempt to shift liability to it in
another situation where it is acting as aggregator rather than
AHBank.
The evolution of aggregation may also work to reduce the
number of situations where aggregators are a significant concern to
AHBanks. Consider the case of a bank holding company's
branded/sponsored aggregation site. If a customer signs up for
aggregation at that site, he may have six accounts that are
designated for aggregation. It is certainly possible that one or
more of these six accounts (e.g., the checking account, a money
market account, and a couple of credit card accounts) may be with
the bank holding company's subsidiaries. To the extent that an
aggregator and an AHBank are members of the same financial
family (e.g., within the same bank holding company), any
arguments that the AHBank might otherwise use under Reg E to
avoid liability to the customer for an unauthorized transaction
should evaporate, as a practical matter. While the various
subsidiary entities might argue among themselves as to which is to
write-off a loss from an unauthorized transaction, the customer
should be taken care of. The emergence of large financial
institutions with many customer accounts in the aggregation space
should lessen the frequency with which unrelated small entities are
aggregating information from such banks' customers' accounts.
Other relevant practical considerations are which persons or
groups within the AHBank are making decisions on the issue and
be allocated between an aggregator and an AHBank in situations where a
consumer is alleging that an unauthorized transaction has occurred. See generally
12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2001).
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how much thought is going into those decisions. Additionally,
what is the "climate" or philosophy within the institution at the
time the issue arises? At various times, the relevant philosophy
within an institution differs-it is determined by the specific people
involved in decision making on a specific issue together with the
general financial conditions within the economy and the institution.
It may range between always "taking care of the customer" and
"the customer is always right" to parsing words so as to do only
what is unarguably technically required. If significant losses tied to
aggregation by consumers occur, the philosophy may shift to one of
aggressively pursuing aggregators on negligence or other theories.
V. WHAT HAS CAUSED THE CONCERN WITH ACCOUNT
AGGREGATION?
Given the state of aggregation at the middle of 2002, one
might well ask why there has been such a vocal concern with
aggregation and the prospective allocation or definition of
liabilities. The answer may lie in the historical development of the
aggregation product. In late 1999 through early 2000, a number of
small entities suddenly emerged offering screen-scraping-based
account aggregation.' These entities were generally newly formed,
and in many cases had few assets. Additionally, these early
aggregation services received significant attention in the trade
press as perhaps forming the basis for the next "killer" application
in consumer financial services. 5
AHBanks were concerned that these small screen-scraping-
based entities would create customer service problems in the
financial institution's relationships with its customers; specifically,
that account information was being reflected inaccurately or
without adequate disclosure of limitations on the accuracy of such
information.86 Of significant concern was whether consumers
84. See W.A. Lee, Yodlee Takes Lead in Aggregation World, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 8, 2000, at 4A.
85. See, e.g., Bill Currie & Janet Rodger, Aggregation Is Banks' Last Chance
to Win Back Disaffected Customers, AM. BANKER, Mar. 9, 2001, at 14; see also
Lee, supra note 84, at 4A.
86. See, e.g., Schmelzer Letter, supra note 77 (noting that the accompanying
report, entitled WEB AGGREGATION, A SNAPSHOT, summarizes issues of concern
to financial institutions).
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might take action in reliance on bad account data and then look to
the financial institutions to solve their resulting problems. 7
Financial institutions were also concerned that inadequate security
procedures used by the unknown aggregators would result in a
significant increase in unauthorized transactions for which the
financial institutions might bear financial responsibility.88 The basic
concern was that the AHBanks had no way to protect
themselves-and no way to prevent or quantify the risk of loss.89
To summarize: (1) the degree of concern with the introduction of
financial account aggregation apparently resulted from the
potential of "screen scraping" to dramatically increase the amount
of financial data available at small, unknown, non-financial
institution aggregation sites, and (2) the large amount of "hype"
that the aggregation services were receiving further heightened the
financial institutions' concerns.
The evolution of aggregation appears to have significantly
diminished these initial concerns. The most common approach to
offering aggregation services has changed from portals or small,
non-bank aggregators competing with the financial institutions to
financial institutions entering into partnerships with the early
aggregators, with those entities now providing
technical/operational services on the financial institutions' behalf.'
87. See, e.g., BITS PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at E-2.
88. See, e.g., Letter from Morrison & Foerster LLP, writing on behalf of Star
Systems, Inc., to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System Re Docket R-1074 (Aug. 31, 2000) (on file with the
FRB).
89. See, e.g., Letter from Paula Holstein, Vice President First Union Corp., to
Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System Re Docket R-1074 (Aug. 31, 2000) (on file with the FRB); Rob
Blackwell, Banks Urge Fed: Extend Reg E to Cover Aggregators, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 6, 2000, at 4; Jessica Toonkel, Banks Stop Whining, Learn to Love
Aggregation, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 2000, at 3A. These issues are reflected in the
decision by First Union Corp. to sue PayTrust in late 1999. See First Union Corp.
v. Secure Commerce Services, Inc., No. 3:99CV-519-P, (W.D.N.C. 1999).
90. See, e.g., Michelle Heller, Aggregators Playing By the Rules Get Nod in
Poll, AM. BANKER, Aug. 17, 2000, at 4 (discussing the overwhelming view of
consumers as reflected in a 2000 survey by Star Systems that aggregation services
should be provided or supported by their financial institutions); Megan J. Ptacek,
Online Banking: Aggregator-Blocking Service May Be Blocked by Bad Timing,
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With financial institutions or larger brand names such as Yahoo,
Inc., America Online, and Microsoft now standing behind many
aggregation sites,9 the concern that massive unresolved problems
will result from aggregation by small providers with limited
capitalization appears to have significantly diminished. This
greater confidence in aggregation providers is reinforced by the
reality that, to date, none of the anticipated financial liability issues
has cost financial institutions any significant real life dollars.
At this point in time, new concerns may be arising and new
challenges are appearing in the aggregation arena with respect to
dealing with third party service providers and the outsourcing of
services.92  Additionally, privacy concerns are being raised
concerning the uses that may be made of aggregated data. Both
subjects are beyond the scope of this Article.93
CONCLUSION
It seems too early in the development of aggregation services
for any regulatory or legislative action to be appropriate or
necessary. It appears prudent to let the business develop before
considering action to allocate liability given (1) the absence of any
significant dollar losses clearly tied to aggregation services and (2)
AM. BANKER, Feb. 16, 2001, at 1; Comment: Account Aggregation Brings Both
Opportunities and Risks, AM. BANKER, June 13, 2001, at 17; Miriam Leuchter,
Aggregation Aggravation, US BANKER, Oct. 2000, at 28; Kimberly L. Wierzel,
Technology If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them: Data Aggregators and Financial
Institutions, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 457, 458-62 (2001).
91. See, e.g., Megan J. Ptacek, Aggregation Just One Dish on B of A Web
Menu for '01, AM. BANKER, Oct. 17, 2000, at 14.
92. For a general discussion on outsourcing and privacy issues in connection
with aggregation, see Julie L. Williams, The Impact of Aggregation on the
Financial Services Industry, Remarks before the American Banker's 2 d Account
Aggregation Conference (Apr. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2001%2D39.txt (last visited Apr. 2, 2003);
see also Megan J. Ptacek, OCC Counsel Urges Banks to Monitor Aggregators,
AM. BANKER, Apr. 24, 2001, at 18; OCC, supra note 28, at 3; Wierzel, supra note
90, at 467.
93. For general background on privacy initiatives and developments
impacting online financial services, see, e.g., Michael A. Benoit and Nicole F.
Munro, Recent Federal Privacy Initiatives Affecting the Electronic Delivery of
Financial Services, 56 Bus. LAW. 1143 (2001); Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr. & Joseph
W. Gelb, Consumer Privacy Regulation and Litigation, 56 Bus. LAW. 1157 (2001).
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the current relatively small number of consumers using
aggregation.94  While theoretical problem areas have been
identified, reports of actual financial losses as a result of
aggregation have not risen to the public consciousness or to the
problem level. In fact, it is possible that so far they are virtually
nonexistent. If aggregation services are provided by financial
institutions or other large fiscally responsible corporate entities,
the possibility exists that most concerns can be handled without
additional legislation or regulation.95 If merchant acquiring banks
or ODFIs are suffering losses based upon transactions tied to the
fraudulent use of information originally provided to an aggregation
site, the solution may start with their duty to carefully screen and
know their own customers.
In response to a June 23, 2000 Request for Comments,96 the
FRB received a wide range of responses from interested parties
concerning risks to AHBanks and consumers from aggregation and
the proposed solutions to those perceived risks.' The problems
94. See, e.g., Letter from Patrick M. Frawley, Senior Vice President Bank of
America Corporation, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System Re Docket R-1074 (Aug. 31, 2000) (on file with the
FRB) (indicating that "[w]e applaud the Board's approach of foregoing any
premature attempt at regulation in favor of first gathering information to learn
more about aggregation.").
95. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 50 (discussing the view that system rules
might be preferable to state or federal regulations).
96. See Federal Resolution Board, Request for Comments on Proposed
Changes to the Official Staff Commentary on Regulation E [Docket No. R-1074]
(June 23, 2000) (requesting information on how aggregation services worked and
the potential coverage of Regulation E to such services), available at
http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/press/boardacts/2000/20000623/attachm
ent.p. The Federal Resolution Board has not yet formally addressed these issues.
See Federal Resolution Board, Final Rule Revising the Official Staff
Commentary to Regulation E (March 13, 2001), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/boardacts/2001/20010313/attachm
ent.pd.
97. See, e.g., Adam Wasch, Electronic Commerce: 'Screen-Scrapers' Should
Be Regulated, Banks Tell Fed in Regulation E Comments, in BNA ELECrRONIC
COM. & LAW REP., Sept. 13, 2000, Vol. 5 No. 35, at 911; Letter from Hogan &
Hartson LLP, on behalf of VerticalOne Corporation, to Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Re Docket R-1074
(Aug. 31, 2000) (on file with the FRB); Letter from Morrison & Foerster LLP,
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identified at that time were, perhaps, quite different from those
which would be identified today. The concern was focused on
unregulated non-financial institution aggregation providers and the
problems that they might create. Now, as was described earlier in
this Article, a number of major financial institutions have entered
the aggregation space and concerns appear to be becoming more
focused on (1) the profitability of aggregation, (2) how to obtain
more robust data that can be used as a basis for transactions and
analysis, (3) the risks of outsourcing, and (4) privacy issues.
In August 2001, the FRB received comments in connection
with a more general review of banking regulations governing the
online delivery of financial services." A number of respondents
indicated that, generally, they did not want the FRB to take action
in anticipation of a need but rather that the FRB should wait until
a real need for change is shown.99 Significantly, some argued that
writing on behalf of Star Systems, Inc., to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Re Docket R-1074 (Aug. 31, 2000)
(on file with the FRB); Letter from Lloyd G. Harris, Vice President & Assistant
General Counsel, Chase Manhattan Bank, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Re Docket R-1074 (Aug. 31,
2000) (on file with the FRB) (raising issues such as whether aggregators should
be defined as "financial institutions" under Regulation E); Holstein, supra note
89. One might ask what good it does to simply define an aggregator as a
"financial institution" for Regulation E purposes? Mere revision of this
definition may not establish the aggregator's liability to the consumer for an
unauthorized EFT conducted by a rogue employee or hacker.
The responses indicate that financial institutions are uncomfortable with
being held responsible for unauthorized EFTs connected to information being
provided voluntarily to an aggregator by the consumer. If the goal is to establish
that an .AHBank does not have responsibility for such unauthorized EFTs, a
clear statutory statement that the AHBank shall have no responsibility for losses
suffered by the consumer that can be proved to have resulted from the consumer
providing financial account information/access devices to the aggregator would
be more straightforward.
98. See Federal Resolution Board, Request for Comments on Banking
Regulations with Respect to the Online Delivery of Financial Services [Docket
No. R-1105] (May 16, 2001), available at
http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/press/boardacts/2001/20010516/default.
htm.
99. Letter from Jennifer L. Jones, Vice President and Assistant General
Counsel, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of
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premature regulation might unintentionally deter private sector
providers from pioneering more creative and efficient solutions
potentially beneficial to consumers. Given developments in
aggregation services since the June 23, 2000 Request for
Comments (in particular the accelerated entry of major financial
institutions into the aggregation space as aggregators), it continues
to appear that a hands-off approach to the regulation of
aggregation is warranted.
Existing laws and regulations generally require that the
consumer participating in aggregation be held harmless from the
unauthorized actions of hackers and other third parties with
respect to financial accounts. If consumers were ever realistically
being left unprotected (i.e., if consumers suffer significant losses
that are not protected under existing laws or regulations), that
would be the time to consider stronger enforcement of existing
consumer protection laws or additional legislative or regulatory
action. Laws and regulations should not be added or revised until
it has been demonstrated that existing ones are not adequate to
handle a new service. To the extent that theoretical problems are
Governors of the Federal Reserve System Re Docket R-1105 (Aug. 17, 2001) (on
file with the FRB). This view was articulated in this letter, specifically stating
that:
While Congress and the Agencies should work toward removing existing
barriers to electronic commerce, we ask them also to be cautious that their
efforts do not result in inadvertently creating new barriers in the process. We
believe caution is particularly advisable in areas where the Agencies might
anticipate a potential need or concerns to consumers which has not yet in fact
arisen. We are concerned with attempts by the Agencies to address these
perceived needs by the implementation of prophylactic rules which can create
barriers and huge, unanticipated burdens to financial institutions without
providing a commensurate benefit to consumers.
Id; see also Letters addressed to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System Re: Docket R-1105 (on file with the
FRB) (articulating similar views); Letter from James D. McLaughlin, Director
Regulatory and Trust Affairs, American Bankers Association, to Jennifer J.
Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Aug. 20,
2001) (on file with the FRB); Letter from Phillip A. Wertz, Counsel, Bank of
America, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Aug. 20, 2001) (on file with the FRB); Letter from Charlotte M.
Bahin, Director of Regulatory Affairs and Senior Regulatory Counsel, America's
Community Bankers, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Aug. 20, 2001) (on file with the FRB).
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"solved" by new legislation/regulations before problems actually
develop, the solutions may be irrelevant, unnecessary or produce
unanticipated negative consequences. At this time it appears
sensible for banking regulators to: (1) allow the financial services
industry to exercise its judgment in developing aggregation under
the existing regulatory framework, (2) continue monitoring
business practices and developments in connection with
aggregation, and (3) take regulatory action only if the need is
demonstrated.
Notes & Observations
